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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with fiscal policy coordination within the
European Monetary Union. In the first place, it investigates the
potential problems which are caused by cross-country differences
i n  k e y  f i s c a l  p a r a m e t e r s  a n d  t h e  a s y m m e t r i c  n a t u r e  o f  t h e s e
parameters. In the second section, the pros and cons of policy
coordination evaluated using some multi-country estimates as
point of reference. The empirical results clearly show that policy
coordination within the EMU context is very difficult because of
these country differences and asymmetries. Even so, it is shown
that policy coordination pays off at least in cases where the
countries share the same shocks. Some practical problems of policy
coordination and future prospects are also considered in the paper.
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Fiscal policy faces a number of challenges in the EU. In the first place there are longer
run pressures from ageing and from the competition by countries such as China, with
low wage rates and managed exchange rates. These are both requiring politically
difficult readjustments to ensure that the fiscal position is sustainable. Second, the
nature of the economic cycle tends to mean that downturns are more effective in
shaking out labour than upturns of the same size are in (re)employing it. This
therefore tends to add further pressures in the same direction. The longer term
pressures are being addressed through a number of routes, particularly the Lisbon
Strategy to increase the sustainable rate of growth by one per cent a year and the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines that seek to coordinate the macroeconomic
responses. Ameliorating the from the economic cycle are treated in part by monetary
policy but also by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which seeks on the one hand
to encourage the longer term improvement in fiscal positions by trying to ensure that
budgets are normally in balance or in surplus and on the other by preventing excessive
deficits (deficits exceeding 3 per cent of GDP except under extreme pressures).
The cyclical pressures on fiscal policy are greatest for euro area countries that are
out of phase with the bulk of the euro area and hence with the monetary policy set for
the area as a whole. The same of course applies to countries that have a fixed
exchange rate with the euro, such as those with currency boards. However, several
member states have made the problems worse by failing to ensure a sustainable longer
term fiscal stance. Such failures are clearly asymmetric. There are no examples of
countries that have persistently made errors that lead to them running excess surpluses
and finding that they are facing problems from their accumulation of assets rather than
debts. In this paper we explore the extent of this asymmetry and show that contrary to
some expectations the problems appear to be more in unsustainable tax reductions
than unsustainable expenditure increases. However, we also show that even though
problems may have increased in recent years they are a lot smaller than they were
before the build up to monetary union. Whether or not the SGP is responsible fiscal
responsibility is clearly much greater now than it was twenty years ago. The analysis
of asymmetry provides us a useful starting-point in reconsidering the case for policy2
coordination within the EU. Thus, the paper considers the problems which are related
fiscal policy coordination mainly on the practical level and also provides some
evidence of the effects of coordination. The structure of paper is quite straightforward:
first in section 2 we focus on eventual similarities in differences in fiscal policy
effects, and then in section 3 consider prerequisites for policy coordination. Eventual
gains from coordination considered in section 4 and, finally, some concluding remarks
follow in section 5.
2  How  sensitive  is  the  budget balance  to cyclical
fluctuations?
In this section we turn directly an aspect of fiscal policy that is subject to constraint
under the SGP, namely whether the current rules impose excessive constraints on the
running of deficits. If fluctuations round a prudent longer-term policy would exceed
the 3 percent deficit limit without themselves being destabilising then prima facie the
constraint is too tight. Avoiding the deficits without altering the overall setting of the
fiscal system would involve tightening in the most difficult years just when it is most
harmful to economic stability to do so (and presumably some loosening in better
years, which might be difficult to organise without contributing to unwanted
inflation). Clearly this would defeat the point of stabilising policy. However, to permit
such fluctuations in difficult years without adjusting the structure of the tax and
benefit system a country might have to move quite strongly into surplus in normal
years, such that it would be effectively repaying its debt as a proportion of GDP. For a
country with a low debt ratio this would be a strange strategy if it inhibited growth
enhancing (or revenue enhancing) investment.
For the euro area as a whole of course reducing the debt to GDP ratio is precisely
what is required at present. Most countries are not starting from what is thought to be
a sustainable position and need to consolidate. Indeed for some countries, Finland for
example, there has been no contradiction in needing to run a surplus in normal times
as the government wanted to run the debt ratio down substantially, both to leave room
to act in the event of another serious shock like the banking crisis at the beginning of
the 1990s and to cover unplanned difficulties with the ageing of the population for the3
funding of pensions or provision of services. Indeed Finland went further in building
up buffer funds so that it could absorb some of the shock to unemployment and
pensions from a downturn without the need to borrow, increase taxation or reduce
benefits. This strategy has proved its worth in the present crisis, where Finland has
experienced a greater downturn than most euro area members but without a
catastrophic impact on its debt. However, Finland is not typical.
Other countries have behaved differently. The UK was prepared to run
considerable deficits in the growth phase of the cycle even before the present crisis
put such pressure on it.
1 Indeed one of the reasons why the UK’s attempts to offset the
financial shock have been so modest is that it had very little leeway. However, at
some point this fortunate co-incidence between the need to consolidate and the
constraints of the excessive deficit procedure may not exist.
Views vary as to whether output shocks have substantial effects on the fiscal
balance. If ‘automatic’ stabilisers are important then the balance will move in a
strongly counter-cyclical manner (Buti et al, 1998). The effects may be particularly
strong if buffer funds are used, as exist in Finland and Sweden. However, given
discretionary behaviour by governments, the effects may be attenuated (Melitz, 1997).
For example, when revenues rise governments may be tempted to be somewhat more
lax in their fight against rising expenditures or may take the opportunity to cut taxes.
However, the process may not be symmetric, as cutting expenditures or raising taxes
in downturns tend not to be attractive electorally.
2
There is considerable debate over how to measure the appropriate balances and
Viren (2000b) computes the results for a wide range of definitions as well as for the
expenditure and revenue components separately. Here we deal with just three
definitions using the common specification
1 We do not pursue here the debate about the appropriateness of alternative simple rules for maintaining
prudence, as practised inter alia by the UK. A rule that only permits borrowing for investment by the
public sector is not necessarily stable since the return on many public investments are not purely
financial and may not necessarily pay for themselves. Direct required rates of return may not reflect the
appropriate valuation of the social benefits from the investment.
2 This is the essence of the EDP in the SGP, which is intended to deter countries from getting into the
position where they have impose a fiscal tightening in the middle of a downturn. It is expected to be a
vote loser and hence a very strong incentive for governments to avoid getting into that position.
Experience thus far is decidedly mixed as to whether that incentive has worked. Many of the countries
that have had to act have miscalculated how well their system would stand up in a downturn or simply
wrongly forecast the rate of growth and ended up with lower revenues/higher expenditures than
expected.4
def/y = b0 + b1 def-1/y-1 + b2'y
- + b3 'y
+ + b4 r + b5 D-1/y-1  + u      (1)
where def refers to the measure of the general government balance (surplus or deficit),
D refers to the debt-GDP ratio, y to GDP, r the real interest rate (government bond
yield minus inflation) and u an error term and ' denotes a growth rate (in short, g =
'y). (1) is a straightforward example of a threshold model, where, in this case, the
threshold is applied to the growth rate. Thus -/+ denotes whether the growth rate is
below or above the threshold (normally zero), 'y
+ includes only the above threshold
values and 'y
-only the on and below threshold values. Using data for the period 1971-
2011 from the for the 15 (“old”) EU countries, the estimates are shown in Table 1. In
Table 2, the estimates of the non-linear confidents of output growth for different
definitions of deficits (as well as expenditures and revenues) are reported. The
country-specific estimates are shown in Appendix Figures A1-A3 and Appendix
Table 1)
The three deficit measures, shown in Table 2 (and Appendix Table 1), are
cyclically adjusted net lending, cyclically adjusted net lending less interest payments
and the cyclical component of net lending,  all in relation to (trend) GDP according to
the Commission of the EU. These three cover the range of concepts one might want to
address. The cyclically adjusted deficit gives an idea of the overall stance of fiscal
policy, although the appropriate cyclical adjustment is difficult to achieve. It can be
computed after the event but the policy stance is a forward looking concept that
depends on the forecast of what the trend is likely to be over the medium term –
something that can often be seriously erroneous. We use a well-established definition
rather than entering the debate, especially since it is this definition that is used in the
official EU discussions about the stance of policy. Similarly, while interest payments
are a function of the overall stance, they too vary over the course of the cycle with the
fluctuations in interest rates and outstanding debt.5
Table 1   Evidence of Changing Fiscal Behaviour














































































































Def denotes net lending (thus positive values represent surpluses), g denotes the growth rate of GDP
and exp denotes government expenditures and rev government revenues in relation to GDP. Debt
denotes general government debt in relation to GDP and rr the real interest rate (in terms of
government bond yields). OLS denotes panel least squares (with fixed cross-section effects) estimator,
GLS and GMM the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator with first differences. *) The sample period is
1971-1998. **) The sample period is 1999-2011.
The main implications of the results in the tables are:
(1) Fiscal policy seems to respond to business cycles quite considerably. Thus, the
deficit elasticities with respect to output growth appear to be around 0.2-0.3 for a
one-year horizon (clearly more than obtained by Melitz (1997)).
(2)  There appears to be strong evidence of asymmetric cyclical behaviour in
government deficits. The output effects on deficits seem to differ depending on the
business cycle regime: they appear to be much strong in depressions (output
falling) than in booms. The hypothesis of equal coefficients for these regimes can
be rejected quite clearly.
3
3 The (possibly nonzero) threshold estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure was close to zero
so the results using it are not reported.6
(3) Asymmetries mainly relate to the structural deficit. Thus, the cyclical component
of the government deficit seems to behave more or less symmetrically in terms of
output fluctuations. This means that when output decreases structural deficits
increase but when output increases structural deficits also tend to increase
(surpluses decrease). The problem thus lies with discretionary behaviour rather
than with automatic stabilisation. In good times discretionary policy appears to
have been perverse.
(4)  The different cyclical effects show up in both revenues and expenditures.
Revenues seem to be more sensitive to output growth in depressions than in
booms. Thus, when output grows, the revenue/trend output ratio remains more or
less constant, while in depressions it decreases quite markedly. Expenditures seem
to increase in depressions and decrease in booms. This probably reflects changes in
government transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits).
(5) The direct effect of interest rates on deficits can be clearly discerned. The effect is
particularly strong with net lending but it also shows in primary deficits. Thus, an
increase in interest rates leads to some loosening of fiscal policies, and vice versa.
The net lending effect obviously reflects the direct expenditure effect on interest
expenses but the primary deficit effect is a bit hard to be interpreted.
(6)More interestingly, the effect of government debt also turns out to be both
significant and of ‘correct’ sign and magnitude. Larger debt leads to some
correction in the form of lower deficits.
We do however have to be rather cautious in interpreting these results, as the
reverse impact of the fiscal balance on output has not been taken into account in
estimation on the grounds that it occurs with a lag (while the effect of growth on the
deficit is contemporaneous).
 Since the requirements were to be able to keep the public sector deficit below 3per
cen t of  GDP an d the deb t to GDP rel ati on b el ow 60 per cen t (or sh ow adequate
progress in bringing the debt ratio down to that level) we could expect a change in
behavior as countries tried to qualify. The assessment was made in the first part of
1998 and hence member states needed to qualify from around 1997 onwards, which
implies action in the years before then if the general structure of the fiscal stance7
needed adjustment.
4 In the same way, within Stage 3 the members are bound by the
term s of  the SGP which also attem pts to get countries to bring thei r debt to GDP
ratios down and to keep their deficits less than 3 per cent of GDP. Indeed, as
discussed earlier, the objective has been to try to attain a surplus or at least balance in
normal times. However, once membership was achieved, the sanctions became
different. Countries could be subject to an Excessive Deficit Procedure under the
terms of the SGP. Thus far no sanctions have been applied and the SGP itself was
revised in 2005, making the occurrence of an excessive deficit less likely,
nevertheless, the chances are that countries would become increasingly concerned to
control deficits as they rose as a proportion of GDP.
Table 2  The output growth coefficients with different fiscal variables
Dependent variable g<0 g>0




































The data cover the period 1971-2011. Data source: AMECO data base. All variables are expressed in
relation to trend GDP.
4 We can probably neglect the first possible qualification date in 1996 as at that point only Luxembourg
qualified on all criteria and it was clear early on that there would be insufficient countries to make
starting the third stage of monetary union politically feasible. Hence countries are unlikely to have
made special efforts during that period.8
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The implications behind this are that we would see two or possibly three regimes in
the data. The period of qualification would entail a very specific effort as failure
would lead to not being in monetary union at the start. Hence the sanction is clearly
harsher than that through the EDP. A look at the data, Figure 1, confirms this. Deficits
did indeed decrease markedly after 1995. Similarly the debt ratio began to fall. It is
clear that the main adjustment came through expenditures rather than revenues. After
monetary union there is little further change and the improvement in debt ratios tails
o f f .  O f  c o u r s e  i f  w e  w e r e  t o  a d d  t h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  y e a r s  w e  w o u l d  s e e  a  d r a s t i c
worsening. However, these remarks ignore the state of the economic cycle. As is clear
much of the adjustment is simply on the back of the upturn between 1996 and 2000
and the worsening thereafter reflects the downturn. Nevertheless the fact that deficits
in the 2001-2 downturn do not fall as far as their values in the previous two peaks in
the 1975 to 1990 period shows there has been a major change in behavior. To some
extent this may reflect the fact that by this time inflation has also been brought firmly
under control. On the one hand inflation erodes the real value of debt and makes it
easier to have negative real interest but on the other low inflation restricts the
automatic creep in revenues through a progressive taxation.
We do not have enough data to determine all these possible break points in behavior
econometrically but we can explore whether there is a change in behavior in 1995,
when convergence began in earnest, as well as whether there was one in 1999 when10
the euro area started (Table 1). From the first rows of this table it appears that the
disciplining effect of debt on deficits is if anything a little lower after the start of
Stage 3. This is surprising as not only is there the traditional constraint from the
increased cost of servicing but the Maastricht convergence criteria, which continued
into an ongoing commitment, also tried to keep debt ratios below 60% of GDP and
encourage steady improvement in fiscal prudence, thus doubling up the incentives.
However, the clearest change in behavior is in the period 1995-2001, when the
member states needed to qualify and then before the performance of the euro area
began to weaken.
Estimates of the disciplinary effect of debt vary a lot depending on the
specification estimated and on the time period. The EMU period appears to be
somewhat different from earlier periods e.g. in terms of cyclical sensitivity and the
role of inflation but it appears that the disciplinary role of debt is not very significant.
In fact, it is the late 1990s which appears to be somewhat different in this respect. The
difference can be seen quite clearly by computing a time-varying coefficient for the
lagged debt/GDP ratio (Figure 2). On the basis of the Figure one might say that it is
1995 or 1996 when fiscal behavior changed towards more disciplinary direction but
already in 2002/2003 some deterioration took place. (It is also clear from the Figure
that each of the oil crises, 1975, 1981 and 1995 caused a step up in impact of debt,
only first of which was reversed.)
The nature of the change may be better understood by scrutinizing the behavior of
expenditures and revenues (see the subsequent four rows in Table 1). As these rows
show, the effect is not symmetric on expenditures and revenues. Expenditures fell
quite strongly compared to GDP when growth rates rose before Stage 3 but the effect
was clearly more limited thereafter. Before Stage 3 tax revenues were if anything pro-
cyclical.
We can see the extent of the asymmetry if we allow the coefficient on the growth
rate to be different in down and up phases of the cycle (the last two rows of  the
Table). In the period before Stage 3 there was indeed asymmetry with the response
being less when output gaps were negative. In Stage 3 this effect has become stronger
(the hypothesis of symmetry can be rejected more decisively). This does imply that11
the expected effect has occurred and there has been a stronger attempt to contain
deficits in downturns.
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3  Stabilisation  and  policy  co-ordination
Our secon d con cern i n  thi s ch apter i s  wi th  th e scope f or i m prov ed ou tcom es  th at
m i g h t  s t e m  f r o m  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  u n d e r  E M U  a n d  u n d e r  t h e  S G P  i n
particular. If the ability to co-ordinate is increased then this may help offset some of
the disadvantages from the inability to run an independent macroeconomic policy. (It
is of course always debatable the extent to which there was scope for independent
action by the smaller countries in the previous regime, as in the main they had to
follow the German lead because their economies were so integrated.)
Here, we abstain from most theoretical issues of coordination (under which cases
coordination may pay off, how coordination changes the modelling framework and
so). See Branson et al (1990), Ganzoneri and Minford (1988), Gorden (1985) Kehoe
(1987/1988) Oudiz and Sachs (1984) and Rogoff (1985) for some key references.
The EU does not attempt fiscal coordination in a strict sense of the word – there are
no directives to the member states telling them how fiscal policy is to be set as part of12
some annual ‘plan’ - but there is what the European Commission (2002) describes as
‘weak co-ordination’ through the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). Second
there is a set of rules on how budgetary balances may be set, laid out in the SGP
(described by the European Commission (2002) as ‘strong co-ordination’). The
formulation of the BEPG is a complex annual process, orchestrated by the
Commission, aimed at trying to ensure that the macroeconomic policies of the
member states contribute to the overall goal of sustainable non-inflationary growth
that achieves full employment. Much of what is involved relates to structural policies,
wage developments and labour market reform – the Cardiff, Cologne and
Luxembourg ‘processes’ – but also involves the application of the SGP. While the
BEPG have no legal force and rely on peer pressure for their achievement, the SGP
does have some coercive powers, although despite breaches no penalties have as yet
been imposed.
The SGP has two main sides to it. The first is to try to ensure that the member
states all achieve a strong and sustainable budgetary position. This involves progress
each year towards having a low debt ratio. While the end point has not been defined
the process involves trying to remain in surplus or in balance through the course of the
cycle. In order to qualify for monetary union the member states were supposed to
have a debt ratio of less than 60% of GDP or be making sustainable progress to
achieving that. While that state was somewhat liberally interpreted in 1998 when the
original membership of the monetary union was decided it has nevertheless remained
at the heart of the Commission’s longer term predictions. The second side to the SGP
is the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which is designed to prevent deficits in any
particular year exceeding 3% GDP except in cases of severe economic difficulty, as
applied to several member states in the present crisis.
Like the BEPG the EDP is essentially forward looking. If a country looks, in the
view of the Commission, that it is going to run an excess deficit, then it has to take
steps to try to avoid it. If these steps are not taken and an excess deficit appears,
ultimately the member state has to make a non-interest bearing deposit from which the
remaining states benefit. This can ultimately be converted into a fine if action is not
taken of a period of two years. The detail, as set out in European Commission (2002)
as amended, need not concern us here. In Chapter 9 we look at the impact that this
asymmetric EDP has in policy. In this chapter our concern is with co-ordination.13
Co-ordination in the SGP framework is largely a matter of the appropriate design
of the system (Viren, 2000b). It is not realistic to think of negotiated decisions that
would lead to one country following an expansionary policy in order to help offset a
deflationary shock to another. This does not of course involve fiscal federalism, as
this is not part of the current EU arrangements except in rather indirect manner
through the structural funds. This is an area where the EU differs clearly from other
countries and federal arrangements. Others have found the substantial ‘automatic’
transfer of resources from the ‘gainers’ to the ‘losers’ when shocks hit, on a scale not
contemplated by the EU, to be a necessary part of the attack on social exclusion. The
absence of such mechanisms in the EU has been a persistent source of criticism (see,
for example, Feldstein, 1997). Politically, it is pretty clear that a substantial system of
inter-regional transfers similar to those that apply in the US, Germany, Canada or
other mature fiscal federations is implausible for the foreseeable future. This in itself
constrains what might be possible in social policy, because with a budget capped at
just 1.27% of GNP, the EU level cannot aspire to engage in the forms of equalisation
and redistribution that the economic theories of fiscal federalism would prescribe (see,
notably, Oates, 1999). Yet it should not be overlooked that within member states,
these mechanisms are, typically already well developed: Southern England, for
example, manifestly transfers resources to the ‘North’, while in Italy the geographical
transfer is North to South; Germany transfers from West to East, Ireland from East to
West. Again, co-ordination can help to maximise the impact of such mechanisms.
The key element in this discussion will therefore be the ‘automatic’ stabilisers.
5
Automatic in inverted commas because this includes the normal response of
governments, which as we have noted is often asymmetric, differing between upturns
and downturns – we explore this asymmetry in detail in Chapter 9. We should not
regard co-ordination through automatic stabilisation in this sense as being necessarily
a favourable response (Blanchard, 1990) as this reaction is appropriate to demand
shocks. Supply shocks can require quite the opposite response.
5 The normal definition of automatic stabilisation relates to the fact that the tax and benefit system,
widely defined, is contracyclical in nature. As the economy slows, tax revenues slow more than
proportionately and unemployment starts to rise generating increased welfare payments and activity
measures to try to get people back into work. Thus the budgetary position worsens on both the revenue
and expenditure sides of the account. The reverse happens in an expansion and a ‘sustainable’ fiscal
system should be able to go through the cycle without the need to change tax rate or expenditure rules.14
Fiscal policy coordination in the sense we are describing has certain requirements
for it to take full effect:
1.  The cyclical behaviour of the economies and the nature of shocks must be
similar.
2.  Countries must have similar prerequisites for policy actions.
3.  The tax and transfer systems and the budgetary process must be similar so as
to provide reasonably similar automatic stabilisers.
4.  Forecasts and the assessment of the current situations must be sufficiently
accurate.
5.  Effects of fiscal policy actions must be reasonably similar and predictable.
6.  The effectiveness of coordinated policy actions must be much larger than un-
coordinated actions.
7. D i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s  m u s t  s h a r e  t h e  s a m e  p o l i c y  v i e w  ( i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e
instruments and objectives of policy).
8. Policy commitments must be enforceable in different countries
These requirements are all straightforward in nature. If problems are uncorrelated
then joint action is less likely to be valuable. If countries do not behave in a fairly
similar manner then having relatively uniform prespecified responses is unlikely to
constitute an optimal policy. If we do not know what the impact of policy is going to
be on the economies then it is much more difficult to decide what to do. Perhaps the
most important element that has to be sorted out is a reasonably accurate
decomposition of the key variables into their ‘cyclical’ and structural components
(Brandner et al. 1998). Lastly the incentive structures must be adequate. If there is
l i t t l e  t o  b e  g a i n e d  f r o m  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  b u t  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o s t s  ( b o t h  e c o n o m i c  a n d
political) in precomitting to do so then co-ordination is less likely. Similarly if there
are no adequate penalties for reneging the incentive to free ride on the system will be
substantial. Given that is known, again countries will not co-operate.
Figures 3-5 give some idea of the degree of homogeneity between EU/EMU
countries. Thus, Figure 3 focuses on the magnitude of asymmetric shocks within the
EU27 countries while Figure 4 compares the cross-section and time-series variance of
GDP for these countries. Finally, Figure 5 compares the time series behaviour of
deficits (and GDP) vis a vis Germany for the period 1971-2011.15
Figure 3 Measuring asymmetries in EU 27 countries
A test for asymmetric shocks for output is done by running a regression
¨yi= Į + ȕ¨yEU  and displaying the estimated ȕ coefficient
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The data are from 27 EU countries. The sample period is 1976.1-2008.4, thenumber of countries is 25
(for data reasons, Romania and Bulgaria are not included).16
Figure 5 Common features of deficits and output growth
Both measures have been computed in terms of Germany using the same procedure as in Figure 3
One simple way of making comparisons between countries is to estimate a simple
VAR model and comepare the impulse response functions. For purpose, we estimated
a three-variable VAR with output growth, the real interest rate and the deficit/GDP
ratio. Impuse responses were computed by the Cholseky decomposition (using the
above-emtioned variable ordering). The average IRF values for 10 periods are
presented in Figure 6 below (estimates are based on EU15 data for 1971-2011)
deficits17
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It is interesting to compare the IRF’s over countries especially because they are
appear to enormously different for certain variables. This is especially true for the
effect of government surplus/deficit on GDP growth. The average value of correlation
coefficients is practically zero (more precisely, 0.011). A bit more higher values are
obtained with the correlations in terms of output growth vs. real interest rate (0.144)
and government deficit (ratio) vs. real interest rate (0.268) but only with the impulse
responses of government deficit in terms of output growth threes appears to be a
reasonable amount of  similarity (average value of IRF correlations is 0.779).
Needless to say, but the results indicate that the transmission mechanisms of fiscal
policy are indeed enormously different reflecting deeper differences in fiscal
institution, fiscal rules and the structure of economy.18
4  Assessing  the  Pros  and  Cons  of Policy Co-ordination
To assess the importance of policy coordination for policy effectiveness we use the
NiGEM multicountry model to compare the effects of different fiscal policy actions in
the single country setting and in the case of collective policy action.
6 In the
simulations (see Table 3) public consumption was first increased in all EU countries
in an un-coordinated way (i.e. country-by-country). Then it was increased in all EMU
countries at the same time and by the same amount (1 per cent).
7
Table 3 A summary of the public consumption simulation
y4 y8 yc4 yc8 ymax ycmax def defc ym ymc
Austria 0.059 0.042 0.162 0.143 0.107 0.279 –0.154 –0.075 0.574 1.489
Belgium 0.099 0.074 0.233 0.208 0.113 0.239 –0.220 –0.107 0.536 1.131
Finland 0.124 0.151 0.175 0.228 0.159 0.268 –0.117 –0.050 0.741 1.251
France 0.273 0.261 0.333 0.332 0.274 0.339 –0.168 –0.144 1.130 1.398
Germany 0.224 0.156 0.304 0.224 0.299 0.374 –0.167 –0.130 1.574 1.967
Ireland 0.065 0.054 0.232 0.189 0.066 0.233 –0.127 –0.079 0.488 1.740
Italy 0.147 0.128 0.208 0.189 0.156 0.212 –0.146 –0.102 0.829 1.128
Netherlan
ds
0.107 0.090 0.211 0.195 0.121 0.219 –0.230 –0.144 0.891 1.612
Portugal 0.092 0.076 0.156 0.157 0.116 0.241 –0.185 –0.144 0.574 1.193
Spain 0.166 0.159 0.246 0.274 0.175 0.274 –0.157 –0.109 1.109 1.732
Average 0.136 0.119 0.226 0.214 0.159 0.268 –0.167 –0.108 0.845 1.464
y4 (y8) denotes the output effect of an uncoordinated increase in public consumption (by 1 per cent)
after four (eight) quarters, y4c and y8c denote the corresponding values in a case where all countries
increase public consumption by the same amount, ymax and ycmax denote the maximum values of y
over 20 quarters and ym and ymc the corresponding multiplier values for an increase in public
consumption by one per cent of GDP. Def and defc denote the deficit effects of an increase in public
consumption computed after 20 quarters.
6 In evaluating the effects of fiscal policy, an obvious analytical framework is provided by (structural)
VAR models (see Blanchard and Perotti (1999), Dalsgaard and De Serres (1999) and Virén (2000a)).
Because we concentrate here on the policy coordination problem, structural multicountry models are,
however, more convenient. The model vintage used was 2002.
7 T h e  s h a r e  o f  p u b l i c  c o n s u m p t i o n  i n  G D P  d i f f e r s  s o m e w h a t  a c r o s s  E U  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  s o  t h e
corresponding GDP effects also differ. The differences in the public consumption/GDP ratio are after
all not so large as the following 1998 values indicate: Austria 18.7 %, Belgium 21.1 %, Denmark
25.5 %, Finland 21.4 %, France 24.2 %, Germany 19.0 %, Greece 14.8 %, Ireland 13.4  %, Italy
18.8 %, Luxembourg 14.0 %, Netherlands 13.6 %, Portugal 20.2 %, Spain 15.8 %, Sweden 25.9 % and
UK 18.2 %.19
In all cases the coordinated fiscal expansion produces almost twice as much an
increase in output as an uncoordinated fiscal expansion. (In Table 3 the insertion of
the letter c in the variable name shows the results of the co-ordinated action, with the
exact definitions of the variables shown in the footnote to the Table.) As expected we
h a v e  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  i n  u n c o o r d i n a t e d  a c t i o n s  s m a l l  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  a b l e  t o  a c h i e v e
relatively little (mainly because of import leakage).
T h e  m u l t i p l i e r  v a l u e s  ( t h e  l a s t  t w o  c o l u m n s  i n  T a b l e  3 )  r e v e a l  t h a t  i n  a n
uncoordinated case fiscal policy effects for the small countries are mainly only around
0.5. For large countries, the values exceed unity but not by very much. The average
value for all countries is 0.72 (with four lags) and 0.63 (with eight lags), 0.85 being
the average maximum value. In the case of coordinated policies, there is not much
difference between small and large countries. Thus, the average value is 1.25 (with
four lags) and 1.17 (with eight lags), 1.46 being again the average maximum value.
T h i s  r e p r e s en ts  a n  i m p r ov em en t f or  al l  c ou n tri es  b u t a  m aj or  on e f or  th e  sm al l e r
countries. The multiplier values (in the coordination case) are, in fact, quite close to
the values obtained by Cohen and Follette (1999) with the US FRB/US
macroeconomic model.
8 On the other hand, they are a bit higher than the SVAR
values obtained by Blanchard and Perotti (1999), which are about one. The multiplier
values in the uncoordinated case are, of course very low (suggesting that the marginal
propensity to spend out of income is very low and the income elasticity of imports is
very high) but also in the case of coordinated fiscal policies the multipliers are not
terribly high although they obviously still facilitate fiscal policies. Note also that the
in the case of uncoordinated policies, the output effect diminishes more rapidly than
in the case of coordinated policies.
The effect of an increase in public consumption on government deficits is almost
equally clear (see Figure 7). Deficits increase but because output also increases the
effect on the deficit/GDP ratio differs from the pure deficit effect. The values for
various countries are surprisingly different, reflecting the differences in the output
effects. In other respects, it is rather difficult to say why the country results are so
8 The Cohen and Follette (1999) value with US data (with four lags) was 1.23 which may be compared
with our average EMU10 value of 1.25. When the tax rates were set to zero in the FRB/US model the
multiplier increased to 1.35 which indicates how much (or, in fact, little) automatic stabilisers will
affect on the multiplier. An interesting thing is that the multiplier value of 1.25 implies a relatively low
value of the marginal propensity to consume. Assuming the average tax rate to be 0.4 we end up with a
marginal propensity to consume to be about 0.3 only (or, 0.4 if we account for imports).20
different (the si ze of  the country  and the size of the public sector do not seem  to
explain the size of the output and deficit effects).
In  th ese sh or t run  sim ul ati on s i t i s perh aps  reason abl e to i gn ore  th e l on g term
solvency constraint but, not surprisingly, imposing the solvency condition makes a lot
of difference, particularly in the long run (when the additional taxes start to have an
effect). Thus, the GDP effect almost completely vanishes and the effect on deficits is
also quite marginal. If countries increase public consumption and balance the budget
in the long run by raising taxes, the long-run output effect is simply zero or even
negative.
9 Gains from coordination seem to be much larger for small countries while
the impact of the solvency requirement depends mainly on the size and nature of the
fiscal policy effect.
So far, we have considered public consumption only but the picture for direct taxes
is very similar. Coordination makes a lot of difference in terms of output effects but
the results are less clear for the deficit/GDP ratio. The problem stems from the output
effects. When taxes are increased, output and income decrease, which eliminates part
of tax revenues and – ceteris paribus – increases the deficit/GDP ratio because of
lower output. If taxes are increased (by one per cent) in all EMU member countries at
the same time, Finland’s GDP would fall by almost half a per cent and that would also
lead to a smaller surplus/GDP ratio (Figure 8).
The long-run effect of direct taxes (on output) is noticeably larger than the effect of
public consumption. This mainly reflects the larger GDP share of taxes compared
with public consumption.
10 The dynamics of the effects are, however, quite different,
as can be seen from Figure 9, which illustrates the effects for the whole EMU area.
The effect of public consumption diminishes over time while the tax effect shows no
signs of a diminished impact.
9 The importance of the solvency condition obviously depends on the level of debt in the country
concerned. Given the fact that indebtedness still varies a great deal among the EU countries, we again
face an aggregatio n problem in pursuing EU fiscal policies (see Mayes and Virén (2011) for mo re
about this problem in terms of monetary policy).
10 In Finland, for instance, the share of public consumption in GDP was 20.7 per cent in the first quarter
of 2000 while the share of direct taxes was 27.1 per cent.21
Figure. 7 Long-run effect of a one per cent increase in public consumption on


















Figure 8   Effect of an increase in direct taxes on GDP and government
surplus/GDP with and without policy coordination22
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When dealing with fiscal policy simulation, an obvious question is what happens to
interest rates. The answer provided by the NiGEM model is ‘not very much’. Thus,
imposing the inflation targeting assumption for monetary policy produces only a five
basis point increase in long rates in the case of coordinated policies. In the case of
uncoordinated policies, the result is practically zero (for instance, in the case of
Finland, just one tenth of a basis point). The NiGEM model, like most other models,
generates the somewhat odd result that interest rates have a strong impact on deficits
while deficits have only a very marginal effect on interest rates.
11 This latter result is
obviously in sharp contrast with all theorizing on credibility and peso effects (but not
necessarily with empirical evidence; see eg Alesina et al. (1992)). The model result
only reflects the direct crowding out effect and does not account for direct
expectations and portfolio effects. That is clearly a weakness of the model (and of all
s i m i l a r  m o d e l s ) .  T h e  w e a k n e s s  m a y  a l s o  b e  q u i t e  c r u c i a l  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e
assessment of policy coordination effects within EU.
The implication of these results is interesting. On the one hand it shows that it is
the small countries that have most to gain from policy coordination. However, one can
reverse the argument and point out that the others have the least to lose if it is small
11 As with all such models they are regularly updated, often changing their characteristics markedly.
Using earlier or later vintages of the model would no doubt change all the magnitudes but our concern
here is with the generalized outcome. The benefits of ‘coordination’ mainly accrue to the smaller
countries.23
countries that do not coordinate well. Historically coordination among the EU
countries has been fairly weak (Viren, 2000b) except among the countries tracking the
deutschemark. There will therefore have to be quite a considerable change in
behaviour if this is to occur in future. The SGP has only a limited effect on this as
limiting the size of deficits is only part of the problem. Indeed it is only when fiscal
policy is not coordinated that this is likely to be a problem as such anomalies occur
mainly when small countries experience asymmetric shocks. However, in the early
s t e p s  o f  f i s c a l  c o o r d i n a t i o n  t h r o u g h  E C O F I N  u n d e r  t h e  S G P  t h e  m e m b e r  s t a t e s ,
particularly those involved in the euro group, have sought to go a little further and
recommend general stances for fiscal policy compared with the cycle (relating to the
timing of tax cuts, for example).
The BEPG are readily criticised for having no compulsion but in many respects
this misses the point. It is simply that on the one hand the member states are becoming
steadily more concerned with each other’s policy while on the other they are
becoming more closely linked. Thus, even if overt reasoned policy coordination is in
short supply, there is likely to be increasing coordination simply by result. Even
though many of the processes for co-ordination in areas such employment are through
the even looser Open Method of Coordination (Hodson and Maher, 2001)
nevertheless there has been considerable policy borrowing and a convergence of some
areas, particularly in active labour market polices for example (Bienkowski et al.,
2008; Sapir, 2006).
5  Concluding  remarks
The sources of asymmetry within the euro economy set some clear challenges for
fiscal policy. Policy needs to be asymmetric itself in order to counteract them.
Downward pressures on the economy create greater problems for unemployment and
participation rates than subsequent upturns of the same size unwind. Downside threats
however permit and indeed require much stronger policy reactions and here the
apparent asymmetry in the behavior of the monetary authorities suggests that their
actions will be very much in tune with the fiscal authorities in that phase of the cycle.
  It is however here that the SGP should cut in as the permitted extent of deficits is24
limited. This does not appear to be problem for automatic stabilization but with
discretionary actions. Even with extensive buffers, normal fluctuations round a
sustainable trend do not seem to generate excessive deficits. Abnormal shocks like the
global financial crisis in any case generate exceptions to the excessive deficit
procedure because of the decline in GDP (even before the 2005 changes). The
problem with discretionary actions is that in good time taxes appear to be cut more
than sustainable but are not raised again when the deficit promises to become too
large. Correspondingly governments do not cut back on expenditure in good times
well enough to balance out the tax cuts and are rather too ready to raise expenditure in
the downturn compared to their reluctance to raise taxes. There is therefore a deficit
bias across the cycle, a feature the SGP seems designed to help counter.
The emphasis of the SGP and wider EU level macroeconomic policy on reducing
the general level of debt also seems appropriate as the member states appear to have
reached the point where the share of public spending is sufficiently great that it may
i m p a i r  t h e  o v e r a l l  g r o w t h  r a t e  o f  t h e  e c o n o m y .  T h e r e  m a y  t h e r e f o r e  b e  t e n s i o n
between policies designed to offset the impact of downturns and those aimed at faster
growth. Matching up the two would require a different balance to the pattern of tax
cutting and expenditure increases over the course of the cycle. The SGP pushes in that
direction in the downphase but some other pressure is needed to increase the
pressure/incentives in the up phase. The present crisis has now made the problem
much worse. Some countries that had reached a sustainable position now face
politically difficult budgetary consolidation to return to that path. In some cases this
can be achieved over the course of the cycle but in others it returns them to the
difficulties that prevailed before the lure of being able to join monetary union led
them the change markedly. There is no matching lure now and the pressure will come
simply from the difficulties themselves. For some countries, such as Greece, this
appears to be insufficient.
This leads naturally to one issue that remains - the appropriateness of the ‘penalty’.
Imposing financial penalties on those in difficulty makes their short-run position even
worse, whether or not the penalty has to be levied. The chances are that the excessive
deficits will only be triggered when a country is a downswing. Thus avoiding the
excessive deficit would involve a fiscal tightening exactly when the inclination would
if anything be to do the exact opposite. Thus the economy would be pushed into more25
of a difficulty than it would otherwise. This problem is a good incentive structure for
the time consistency problem. If a member state organizes itself prudently under
normal times then the chance of it being faced by unfortunate pressure to tighten in a
downturn will be small. It is thus well motivated not to get into that sort of position.
The problem then comes if a country has deliberately or through bad luck got to the
point where it will have to apply unfortunate policy or face the fine. The temptation
then must be to defy the rules.
Thus if anything the problem is that the SGP does not threaten effective enough
sanctions, especially if the actual behavior is going to be that the Council of Ministers
will shy away from harsh implementation of the Pact once important member states
get into difficulty. The softening of the Pact in 2005 would be credible if member
states had shown more willingness in the past to adjust without the sanctions. In the
longer-term, however, when there is no particular call for consolidation one might
very well want to move a system that had a rather more sophisticated way of judging
whether policy was prudent.
Clearly the SGP would have to become much more complex if its rules for each
individual country were to be contingent on the general position of the EU. Since all
countries could be trying to improve their own position compared to the others this
would result in a very complex game to determine the overall outcome. It would be
very understandable if the EU were to stick with rules that apply to each individual
country and were contingent purely on that countries actions and prospects. The more
opaque or complex the rule and the more it is open to discussion before it is applied
then the more contentious will be the political debate on each occasion. Simple, hard
and fast (but fair) rules seem a more likely prospect.26
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Appendix
Figure A1 Country-specific nonlinear coefficients of the output growth variable
in the deficit equation29
Figure A2 Country-specific nonlinear coefficients of the output growth variable
in the expenditure equation
Figure A3 Country-specific nonlinear coefficients of the output growth variable
in the revenue equation30
Table A1 Selected country-specific estimates of equation (1) with
different deficit measures




















































































































































































Data def def defex defex defca defca
def denotes net lending, defex net lending excluding interest expenses and defca the structural
deficit. All of these are related to trend GDP. All estimates are SUR estimates. Source: Mayes
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